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Abstract
A practical approach to protecting networks against epidemic processes such as spreading of
infectious diseases, malware, and harmful viral information is to remove some influential nodes
beforehand to fragment the network into small components. Because determining the optimal
order to remove nodes is a computationally hard problem, various approximate algorithms have
been proposed to efficiently fragment networks by sequential node removal. Morone and Makse
proposed an algorithm employing the non-backtracking matrix of given networks, which outper-
forms various existing algorithms. In fact, many empirical networks have community structure,
compromising the assumption of local tree-like structure on which the original algorithm is based.
We develop an immunization algorithm by synergistically combining the Morone-Makse algorithm
and coarse graining of the network in which we regard a community as a supernode. In this way,
we aim to identify nodes that connect different communities at a reasonable computational cost.
The proposed algorithm works more efficiently than the Morone-Makse and other algorithms on
networks with community structure.
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INTRODUCTION
Identification of influential nodes in a network is a topic of interest in network analysis,
enjoying numerous applications. For example, a removal or immunization of an influential
node may suppress spreading of an infectious disease that may occur later. A viral infor-
mation spreading campaign starting from an influential node may be more successful than
a campaign starting from other nodes. There are various notions of influential nodes, as
evinced by a multitude of definitions of node’s centrality corresponding to the aforemen-
tioned and other applications [1]. Among them, a major criterion of the influential node is
that the removal of a node, or immunization, efficiently fragments the network into small
pieces. Because the problem of finding the minimal set of nodes to be immunized to frag-
ment the network is NP-hard [2], various immunization algorithms to determine the order
of the nodes to be removed to realize efficient fragmentation of the network have been pro-
posed [2–12], sometimes with the constraint that the information about the network is only
partially available [6, 13–17]. Notably, although immunizing hubs (i.e., nodes with a large
degree) first is intuitive and much better than randomly selecting nodes to be immunized
[18–20], many immunization algorithms outperform the hub-first immunization algorithm.
Morone and Makse proposed a scalable and powerful algorithm to sequentially remove
nodes and fragment the network into small components as early as possible [9]. Founded on
the message passing approach and theory of non-backtracking matrices, the method calcu-
lates the so-called collective influence (CI) for each node to rank the nodes for prioritization.
Their method, which is referred to as the CI algorithm, outperforms various other known
methods in model and empirical networks. In the present study, we propose a new CI-based
immunization algorithm that is designed to perform well when the network has community
structure.
The CI algorithm assumes that the given network is locally tree-like. In fact, a majority
of empirical networks are not locally tree-like. At a microscopic level, empirical networks
are usually clustered, i.e., full of triangles [1]. At a mesoscopic level, many networks are
composed of communities such that links are dense within communities and sparse across
different communities [21]. Although the CI algorithm also seems to work efficiently in loopy
networks unless loops are not excessive [9], the performance of the CI algorithm on networks
with community structure is unclear. Some extant immunization algorithms are explicitly
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or implicitly informed by community structure [4–6, 10, 15, 16, 22, 23]. The immuniza-
tion algorithms using the betweenness centrality are effective on networks with community
structure [6, 7, 16, 22, 23]. However, they are not scalable due to a high computational
cost of calculating the betweenness centrality [24]. For other immunization algorithms ex-
ploiting community structure of networks, their performance relative to the CI algorithm
is unknown in general [5, 10] or at least for networks with community structure [4, 9]. Yet
other community-based immunization algorithms impose that only local information about
the network is available, mimicking realistic constraints [6, 15, 16]. This constraint naturally
limits the performance of an immunization algorithm.
We develop an immunization algorithm by formulating a CI algorithm for a coarse-grained
network, in which a node represents a community, and a weighted link represents the num-
ber of links between different communities. We compare the performance of the proposed
algorithm with that of the CI algorithm [9], and the conventional algorithm targeting hubs
[18–20], and others [5, 10] when networks have community structure.
THEORY
Consider an undirected and unweighted network having N nodes. The aim of an im-
munization algorithm is to sequentially remove nodes to fragment the network as soon as
possible, i.e., with a small number of removed nodes.
Collective influence
The CI algorithm is based on the scoring of nodes according to the CI value [9]. The CI
of node i is defined as
CI`(i) = zi
∑
j∈∂Ball(i,`)
zj, (1)
where
zi ≡ ki − 1, (2)
ki is the degree of node i, and ∂Ball(i, `) is the set of nodes at distance ` from node i. When
` = 0, the CI is equivalent to the degree as long as the rank order is concerned.
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The CI algorithm calculates the CI`(i) value of all nodes and removes the node with the
largest CI value in one step. Then, the CI values of all the remaining nodes are recalculated,
and the same procedure is repeated.
In fact, we use the order of nodes to be removed determined above as a tentative order.
To improve the overall performance, we reorder the nodes by reinserting them as follows. We
start from the situation in which the fraction of nodes in the largest connected component
(LCC) is equal to or less than 0.01 for the first time. Then, we calculate for each removed
node i the number of components that node i connects if it is reinserted in the current
network. Next, we add back the node that connects the smallest number of connected
components. We repeat this procedure until all the removed nodes are reinserted such that
the initial network is restored.
The computation time of the CI algorithm is evaluated as follows [9]. The calculation
of CI`(i) requires O(1) time for one node, and hence O(N) time for all nodes. Because
sorting the CI`(i) values consumes O(N logN) time, each step of the CI algorithm consumes
O(N logN) time. Therefore, the total computation time until O(N) nodes are removed is
evaluated as O(N2 logN). However, by exploiting the fact that the CI values of only O(1)
nodes are affected by the removal of a single node, one can accelerate the same algorithm
with a max-heap data structure, yielding O(N logN) total computation time [25].
Community-based collective influence
Community structure may make a network not locally tree-like. We propose an immuniza-
tion algorithm by running a weighted-network variant of the CI algorithm on a coarse-grained
network in which a community constitutes a supernode. We first run a community detection
algorithm. Denote by NC the number of communities and by A˜ the NC×NC coarse-grained
weighted adjacency matrix whose (I, J) element is equal to the number of links that connect
communities I and J (I 6= J). We use lowercases (e.g., i, j) to denote individual nodes and
uppercases (e.g., I, J) to denote supernodes, i.e., communities, throughout the text. The
diagonal elements of A˜ are set to zero.
Assume that the coarse-grained network is locally tree-like. By taking into account the
fact that the coarse-grained network is generally a weighted network, we define the CI of
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community I in the coarse-grained network by
CI′`(I) = z
′
I
∑
J∈∂˜Ball(I,`)
z′′J , (3)
where ∂˜Ball(I, `) denotes the set of the communities whose distance from community I is
equal to ` in the coarse-grained network.
We set
z′I ≡
NC∑
I′=1
A˜II′ −min
I′
A˜II′ . (4)
This definition is analogous to zi ≡ ki − 1 in Eq. (1). With this definition of z′I , the CI of
community I is equal to zero when I has only one neighbor, as in the original CI [9, 26].
We set
z′′J ≡
NC∑
J ′=1
A˜JJ ′ − A˜JJ− (` ≥ 1), (5)
where J is a community that is at distance ` from I, and J− is the community that is at
distance `− 1 from I and on the path between I and J (Fig. 1(a)). It should be noted that
z′′J is equal to zero if J
− is the only neighbor of J . It should also be noted that, when every
community consists of only one node in the original network, CI′`(i) = CI`(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Equation (5) is ill-defined for ` = 0. To be consistent with the original definition of the CI,
we define z′′J ≡ z′J for ` = 0. Then, CI′0(I) is large when node I has a large degree in the
coarse-grained network.
Let A = (Aij) be the adjacency matrix of the original network. Equation (3) is rewritten
as
CI′`(I) = z
′
I
∑
i∈ community I
∑
I′∈∂˜Ball(I,1)
∑
i′∈I′ Aii′
A˜II′
∑
J∈∂˜Ball(I,`)
I+=I′
z′′J , (6)
where I+ is the community adjacent to I (hence distance one from I) through which J is
reached from I (Fig. 1(b)). On the basis of Eq. (6), we define the community-based collective
influence (CbCI) of node i, denoted by CbCI(i), as
CbCI(i) = z′I
∑
I′∈∂˜Ball(I,1)
∑
i′∈I′ Aii′
A˜II′
∑
J∈∂˜Ball(I,`)
I+=I′
z′′J , (7)
where node i belongs to community I. In Eq. (7), the importance of a node stems from
three factors. First, CbCI(i) is proportional to z′I , which is essentially the number of inter-
community links of the community to which i belongs. Second, CbCI(i) is large if I has
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many high-degree nodes at distance ` in the coarse-grained network (i.e., sum of z′′J). Third,
CbCI(i) is large if node i has many inter-community links relative to the total number of
inter-community links that community I has (i.e.,
∑
i′∈I′ Aii′/A˜II′). We set ` = 2 in the
following numerical simulations. When ` = 2, I+ in Eqs. (6) and (7) coincide with J− in
Eq. (5) (Fig. 1(b)).
We remove the node with the largest CbCI value. If there are multiple nodes with
the same largest CbCI value, we select the node having the largest degree. If there are
multiple nodes with the same largest CbCI and degree, we break the tie at random. Then,
we recalculate the CbCI for all remaining nodes, remove the node with the largest CbCI,
and repeat the same procedure until the size of the LCC becomes equal to or less than
0.01N . We further optimize the obtained order of node removal by reinsertion, as in the
CI algorithm. We use the coarse-grained network, not the original network, to inform the
reinsertion process in the CbCI algorithm. In other words, the number of communities
that belong to the same component as the reinserted node is measured for each tentatively
reinserted node. We decide to reinsert the node whose presence connects the least number
of communities (Fig. 1(c)).
Given a partitioning of the network into communities, the calculation of CbCI(i) for one
node consumes O(1) time. Therefore, if we adapt the original implementation of the CI
algorithm [9] to the case of the CbCI, sorting of CbCI(i) dominates the computation time of
the CbCI algorithm. The time complexity of the CbCI algorithm is the same as that of the
CI algorithm in Ref. [9], i.e., O(N2 logN), if community detection is not a bottleneck. The
use of the max-heap data structure makes the CbCI algorithm run in O(N logN) time if
NC = O(N) such that the CbCI values of O(1) nodes are affected by the removal of a single
node. Generally speaking, the CbCI algorithm with the max-heap data structure runs in
O(N logN)×O(N/NC) = O((N2/NC) logN) time.
We use the following six algorithms for community detection: (i) Infomap [27, 28], re-
quiring O(M) time [21], where M is the number of links, and hence O(N) time for sparse
networks; (ii) Walktrap, which requires O(N2 logN) for most empirical networks [29]; (iii)
the label-propagation algorithm, requiring nearly linear time in N [30]; (iv) a fast greedy al-
gorithm for modularity maximization, requiring O(N(logN)2) time for sparse networks [31];
(v) modularity maximization based on simulated annealing, which is practical up to ≈ 104
nodes in the original paper [32] and time-consuming because modularity must be maximized
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in a parameter-dependent manner [33]; (vi) the Louvain algorithm, which practically runs
in O(N) time [34]. The last three algorithms intend to maximize the modularity, denoted
by Q. The first three algorithms detect communities according to different criteria.
Except for the simulated annealing algorithm, the computational cost is at most that for
the CbCI algorithm given the partitioning of the network, i.e., O(N2 logN). Therefore, if the
CbCI algorithm is naively implemented, community detection is not a bottleneck in terms
of the computation time when any of these five community detection algorithms is used. If
NC = O(N) and we implement the CbCI algorithm using the max-heap data structure, a
community detection algorithm requiring more than O(N logN) time presents a bottleneck.
In this case, the Infomap when the network is sparse (i.e., M = O(N)), label-propagation
algorithm, and Louvain algorithm retain O(N logN) total computation time of the CbCI
algorithm. The total computation time with any of the other three community detection
algorithms is governed by that of the community detection algorithm.
RESULTS
In this section, we compare the performance of the CbCI algorithm with the CI and other
immunization algorithms (see Methods) on two model networks and 12 empirical networks.
Let q be the fraction of removed nodes. The size of the LCC after qN nodes have been
removed, divided by N , is denoted by G(q).
Scale-free network models with and without community structure
We start by testing various immunization algorithms on a scale-free network model with
built-in community structure (Methods). We sequentially remove nodes from this network
according to each immunization algorithm and track the size of the LCC. We use the com-
munity structure imposed by the model to inform the CbCI and CbDI algorithms. The
results for a range of immunization algorithms are shown in Fig. 2(a). Both CbCI and
CbDI algorithms considerably outperform the CI algorithm. The CbCI algorithm performs
better than the CbDI algorithm. The performance of the CbCI algorithm is close to the
Betweenness algorithm. It should be noted that the Betweenness algorithm, while efficient,
is not scalable to larger networks.
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Next, we consider a scale-free network without community structure, which is generated
by the original BA model withN = 5000 and 〈k〉 ≈ 12 (the parameters of the model are equal
to m0 = m = 6). We run the CbCI and CbDI strategies by applying a community detection
algorithm to the generated network although the BA model lacks community structure. In
fact, all but the label-propagation algorithm returns a partitioning result. The performance
of the different immunization algorithms for this network is compared in Fig. 2(b). The CbCI
algorithm combined with Infomap or Walktrap outperforms the Degree and LSP algorithms.
The performance of the CbCI algorithm is close to that of the CI algorithm except in an
early stage of node removal. A different community-based immunization algorithm, CbDI,
lacks this feature. This result suggests that the CbCI algorithm combined with Infomap or
Walktrap can work efficiently even when the network does not have community structure.
The results for the CbCI and CbDI algorithms combined with the other four community
detection algorithms are shown in Fig. S2(a). The figure suggests that the CbCI algorithm
combined with Infomap or Walktrap performs better than when it is combined with a
different community detection algorithm.
Empirical networks
In this section, we run the CbCI and other algorithms on the following 12 empirical net-
works with community structure. (i) Two networks of Autonomous Systems of the Internet
constructed by the University of Oregon Route Views project [35–37]: A node is an Au-
tonomous System. The network collected on 2 January 2000 and that on 31 March 2001 are
referred to as AS-1 and AS-2, respectively. (ii) Pretty Good Privacy network (PGP) [38]:
Two persons are connected by a link if they share confidential information using the PGP
encryption algorithm on the Internet. (iii) World Wide Web (WWW) [39]: A network of
websites connected by hyperlinks, which is originally a directed network. (iv) Email-based
communication network at Kiel University (referred to as email-uni) [40]: E-mail sending
activity among students, which provides a directed link, recorded over a period of 112 days.
(v) Email-based communication network in Enron Corporation (email-Enron) [36, 41, 42]:
Two e-mail users in the data set are connected by an unweighted directed link if at least
one e-mail has been sent from one user to the other user. (vi) Collaboration networks
in General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology (CA-GrQc), Astro Physics, (CA-Astroph),
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and Condensed Matter, (CA-Condmat) categories [36, 43] and High Energy Physics – Phe-
nomenology (CA-HepPh) and High Energy Physics – Theory (CA-HepTh) categories in
arXiv [35, 36]. By definition, two authors are adjacent if they coauthor a paper. (vii) High-
energy physics citation network within the hep-th category of arXiv (HEP) [44], which is
originally a directed network. For each network, we removed the link weight, self-loops, and
direction of the link, and submitted the LCC to the following analysis. Summary statistics
of these networks including the modularity, Q, are shown in Tables S1 and S2.
We do not investigate the Betweenness immunization algorithm due to its high compu-
tational cost (i.e., O(NM) time for calculating the betweenness centrality of all nodes [24],
hence O(N2M) time for removing O(N) nodes).
The performance of the different immunization algorithms is compared on two empirical
networks in Fig. 3. Among the 12 empirical networks that we tested, these two networks
yielded the smallest and largest modularity values as maximized by the Louvain algorithm.
The figure indicates that the CbCI algorithm combined with Infomap or Walktrap performs
better than the previously proposed algorithms including the CI algorithm in both networks.
The CbCI algorithm performs better than the CI algorithm in many other empirical net-
works as well (Fig. S2(b)–(m)). Furthermore, the CbCI algorithm combined with a different
community detection algorithm also outperforms the CI algorithm in most of the networks
(Fig. S2(b)–(m)).
To be quantitative, we measure the fraction of removed nodes at which the network
fragments into sufficiently small connected components, i.e.,
qc ≡ inf{q : G(q) < θ}, (8)
where we remind that G(q) is the size of the LCC normalized by N . We set θ = 0.05. We
calculate qc for each combination of a network and an immunization algorithm.
The value of qc for each immunization algorithm normalized by the qc value for the CI
algorithm is plotted in Fig. 4. A symbol represents a network. A small normalized value
of qc implies a high efficiency of the immunization algorithm. As expected, the Degree
immunization algorithm performs worse than the CI in all the tested networks (Fig. 4(c)).
For the CbCI algorithm combined with Infomap, qc is smaller by 15.0% to 49.7% than that
for the CI algorithm (Fig. 4(a)). The CbCI algorithm combined with Walktrap shows a
similar performance for all but one networks (Fig. 4(b)). The CbCI algorithm combined
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with three of the other four community detection algorithms performs better than the CI
algorithm for networks with relatively strong community structure (Fig. S3). The CbDI
algorithm combined with Infomap performs better than the CI algorithm for all networks,
but to a lesser extent than the CbCI algorithm combined with Infomap does (Fig. 4(d)).
The CbDI algorithm combined with Walktrap (Fig. 4(e)) and the other four community
detection algorithms (Fig. S3) performs worse than the CI algorithm. The LSP algorithm
performs worse than the CI algorithm in a majority of the networks (Fig. 4(f)).
Even if two immunization algorithms yield the same qc value on the same network, G(q)
may considerably drop at a smaller q value with one immunization algorithm than the
other algorithm. To quantify the performance of immunization algorithms in this sense, we
measure the size of the LCC integrated over q values [7, 45], i.e.,
G ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=0
G(i/N). (9)
It should be noted that G is the area under the curve when G(q) is plotted against q and
ranges between 0 and 1/2. A small G value implies a good performance of an immunization
algorithm.
The value of G for each immunization algorithm normalized by that for the CI algo-
rithm is plotted in Fig. 5. The CbCI algorithm combined with Infomap outperforms the CI
algorithm in 11 out of the 12 networks in terms of G (Fig. 5(a)). Similarly, the CbCI algo-
rithm combined with Walktrap outperforms the CI algorithm in ten out of the 12 networks
(Fig. 5(b)). The CbCI combined with any of the other four community detection algorithms
outperforms the CI algorithm in roughly half of the networks and tends to be efficient for
networks having large modularity values as determined by the Louvain algorithm (Fig. S4).
In particular, for the three networks with the largest modularity, the CbCI algorithm com-
bined with any of the six community detection algorithms outperforms the CI algorithm.
The Degree, CbDI, and LSP algorithms are less efficient than the CI algorithm in terms of
G (Figs. 5(c)–(f) and S4).
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Why do Infomap and Walktrap marry better with the CbCI algorithm than the
other community detection algorithms?
We have shown that the CbCI algorithm is more efficient when it is combined with In-
fomap or Walktrap, in particular Infomap, than with the other four community detection
algorithms. To explore why, we start by measuring the clustering coefficient [46] of the
unweighted version of the coarse-grained networks. We do so because in theory the CI as-
sumes locally tree-like networks [9, 47]. High clustering in the coarse-grained network may
discourage the CbCI algorithm. For each empirical network, we measure the Pearson corre-
lation coefficient between the clustering coefficient and qc normalized by the value for the CI
algorithm. We use the result for each community detection algorithm as a data point such
that the correlation coefficient is calculated on the basis of six data points. The results are
shown in Table I. We find that the clustering coefficient is not consistently correlated with
the normalized qc. The results are qualitatively the same with a weighted clustering coeffi-
cient [48, 49] (Table I). We obtain similar results if G instead of qc is used as a performance
measure (Table II). It should be noted that different community detection algorithms yield
sufficiently different clustering coefficient values including large values (Fig. S5(a)). We con-
clude that the lack of local tree-like structure in the coarse-grained networks is not a strong
determinant of the performance of the CbCI algorithm. This result does not contradict
those for the original CI algorithm, which assumes local tree-like networks, because the CI
algorithm is practically efficient on loopy networks as well [9].
We have set ` = 2, thus ignoring the contribution of nodes in coarse-grained networks
three or more hops away from a focal node. In fact, large coarse-grained networks may have
a large mean path length and deteriorate the performance of the CbCI algorithm. There-
fore, we calculate the correlation coefficient between NC, i.e., the number of the detected
communities, and qC, and between the mean path length in the unweighted coarse-grained
network and qC (Table I). The correlation efficient between G and either NC or the mean
path length is also measured (Table II). The tables indicate that the performance of a com-
munity detection algorithm is not consistently correlated with the mean path length. It is
correlated with NC, but in the manner such that the performance of the CbCI algorithm
improves as NC increases, contrary to the aforementioned postulated mechanism. Therefore,
the use of ` = 2 does not probably explain the reason why a community detection algorithm
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marries the CbCI algorithm better than another.
In fact, the CbCI algorithm performs well when the detected communities have relatively
similar sizes. To show this, we measure the entropy in the partitioning, which is defined
by
∑NC
c=1(N
′
c/N) log(N
′
c/N), where N
′
c is the number of nodes in the cth community. The
entropy ranges between 0 and logNC. A large entropy value implies that the partitioning
of the network is relatively egalitarian. The correlation coefficient between the entropy and
the normalized qc is shown in Table I for each network. The entropy and qc are negatively
correlated with each other for all networks and strongly so for most of the networks. This
result is robust when we normalize the entropy by the largest possible value, i.e., logNC
(Table I), and when the performance measure is replaced by G (Table II).
To assess the robustness of this finding, we calculate the same correlation coefficient
between either the unnormalized or normalized entropy and one of the two performance
measures, but for each community detection algorithm. Now each empirical network consti-
tutes a data point based on which the correlation coefficient is calculated. The correlation
coefficient values are shown in Table III. Although the correlation is weaker than in the
previous case, the correlation between the entropy and either the normalized qC or G is
largely negative, which is consistent with the results shown in Tables I and II. The correla-
tion coefficient between Q and each of the performance measure is also shown in Table III.
The entropy provides a weaker determinant of the performance as compared to Q, which is
expected because the CbCI algorithm is designed for networks with community structure.
Nevertheless, the entropy provides a larger (i.e., more negative) correlation value than Q
does in some cases (Table III).
Infomap tends to detect a large number of communities (Table S2) whose size is less
heterogeneously distributed than the case of the other community detection algorithms
(Figs. S5(i) and (k)). We consider that this is a main reason why Infomap is effective when
combined with the CbCI algorithm. Roughly speaking, the label-propagation algorithm
tends to yield a similarly large number of communities, NC (Table S2). However, the size
of the community is more heterogeneously distributed with the label-propagation algorithm
than with Infomap, as quantified by the entropy measures (Figs. S5(i) and (k)).
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DISCUSSION
We showed that the CbCI immunization algorithm outperforms the CI and some other
algorithms when a given network has community structure. The algorithm aims to pinpoint
nodes that connect different communities at a reasonable computational cost. The CbCI
algorithm is in particular efficient when Infomap [27, 28] is used for detecting communities
beforehand. Infomap runs sufficiently fast at least for sparse networks [21] such that the
entire CbCI algorithm runs as fast as the CI algorithm at least asymptotically in terms
of the network size. The Walktrap community detection algorithm [29] is the second best
among the six candidates to be combined with the CbCI algorithm in terms of the quality of
immunization. However, Walktrap is slower than Infomap. Walktrap consumes longer time
than the main part of the CbCI algorithm, i.e., sequential node removal, when the max-heap
data structure is used for implementing the CbCI algorithm. In this case, the community
detection before starting the node removal is the bottleneck of the entire CbCI algorithm,
and the CbCI algorithm is slower than the CI algorithm. To our numerical efforts, we
recommend Infomap to be combined with the CbCI algorithm.
We argued that Infomap works better in combination with the CbCI algorithm than
the other community detection algorithms do mainly because Infomap yields a relatively
egalitarian distribution of the community size. However, the distribution of the community
size is usually skewed even with Infomap [50]. The CbCI algorithm may work even better if
we use a community detection algorithm that imposes that the detected communities are of
the equal or similar sizes. This problem is known as k-balanced partitioning, where k refers
to the number of communities. Although k-balanced partitioning for general k is notoriously
hard to solve, there are various approximate algorithms for this problem [51–53]. Combining
these algorithms with the CbCI algorithm may be profitable.
We partitioned the network just once in the beginning of the CbCI algorithm and used
the obtained community structure throughout the node removal procedure. This property is
shared by the CbDI algorithm [5] and another immunization algorithm [11]. We may be able
to improve the performance of immunization by updating the community structure during
the node removal. Our preliminary numerical simulations did not yield an improvement of
the CbCI algorithm with online updating of community structure (section S1 in the SI). We
should also bear in mind the computational cost of community detection, which would be
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repeatedly applied in the case of online updating. Nevertheless, this line of improvement
may be worth investigating.
The CI assumes locally tree-like networks [9]. Although the CI algorithm is practically
efficient in moderately loopy networks as well [9], many empirical networks are abundant
in triangles and short cycles such that they are highly loopy [1]. Dense connectivity within
a community implies that there tend to be many triangles and short cycles in a network
with community structure [54, 55]. Then, coarse graining effectively coalesces many tri-
angles and short cycles into one supernode, possibly suppressing their detrimental effects.
At the same time, however, coarse-grained networks tend to have a large clustering coeffi-
cient (Fig. S5(a)). We may be able to improve the performance of the CbCI algorithm by
suppressing the effect of short cycles in coarse-grained networks. Recently, a method has
been proposed to improve the accuracy of estimating the percolation threshold using non-
backtracking matrices, where redundant paths are suppressed in the counting of the paths
[47]. This method applied to both CI and CbCI algorithms may enhance their performance
in the immunization problem.
The recently proposed collective influence propagation (CIp) algorithm, which can be
interpreted as the CI algorithm in the limit of `→∞, generally yields better solutions than
the CI algorithm does [25]. Given that we have not implemented the CIp algorithm in the
present article, we are not arguing that the CbCI algorithm is better than the CIp algorithm.
It should also be noted that we may be able to combine the CbCI algorithm with the idea of
the CIp algorithm (i.e., using the leading left and right eigenvectors of the non-backtracking
matrix) to devise a new algorithm.
METHODS
Immunization algorithms to be compared
We compare the performance of the CI and CbCI algorithms against the following im-
munization algorithms.
• High degree adaptive (abbreviated as Degree) [18–20]: We sequentially remove the
node having the largest degree. If multiple nodes have the largest degree, we break
the tie by selecting one of the largest-degree nodes at random. We recalculate the
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degree after each node has been removed.
• Community-based dynamical importance (CbDI) [5]: This method exploits the com-
munity structure of a network, similar to the CbCI algorithm, but calculates the
importance of a community in the coarse-grained network in terms of the so-called dy-
namical importance [3]. The CbDI algorithm needs a community detection algorithm.
We use each of the six community detection algorithms used in the CbCI algorithm.
The CbDI algorithm runs as follows [5]. We denote by λ˜ and u˜ = (u˜1 · · · u˜NC)>
the largest eigenvalue and the corresponding eigenvector of A˜, respectively. Owing to
the Perron-Frobenius theorem, it holds true that λ˜ > 0 and u˜i ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ NC).
The number of links between node i and to the Jth community is denoted by kiJ ≡∑
j∈ community J Aij. We define x =
(∑NC
J=1,J 6=I kiJ u˜J
)
/λ˜, where I is the community to
which node i belongs. The CbDI of node i is defined by (2u˜I −x)
∑NC
J=1,J 6=I kiJ u˜J . We
remove the nodes in descending order of the CbDI. If there are multiple nodes that
have the same largest CbDI value, we break the tie by selecting the node that has the
largest number of intra-community links. We recalculate the CbDI values of all the
remaining nodes after removing each node. Once all the communities are disconnected,
we sequentially remove the nodes in descending order of kiI . We recalculate kiI of all
the remaining nodes after removing each node.
• The Laplacian spectral partitioning (LSP) algorithm runs as follows [10]:
1. For the largest connected component (LCC), calculate the Fiedler vector, i.e.,
the eigenvector associated with the smallest positive eigenvalue of the Laplacian,
L ≡ DLCC−ALCC, where DLCC denotes the NLCC×NLCC diagonal matrix whose
(i, i) element is equal to the degree of the ith node in the LCC, NLCC is the
number of nodes in the LCC, and ALCC is the adjacency matrix of the LCC.
2. Partition the NLCC nodes into two non-empty groups by thresholding on the
value of the element in the Fiedler vector. Group 1 (group 2) consists of the
nodes whose corresponding element in the Fiedler vector is higher (lower) than a
threshold. There are NLCC − 1 possible ways to bipartition the nodes.
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3. Calculate
Q = min ln
(
2min
K21 +K
2
2
)
+mout ln
(
mout
K1K2
)
, (10)
for each bipartition, where min and mout are the numbers of intra-group and inter-
group links, respectively. K1 and K2 represent the sum of the nodes’ degrees in
groups 1 and 2, respectively.
4. Find the partition that maximizes Q.
5. Given the partition, remove the node that has the largest number of inter-group
links. Then, recalculate the number of inter-group links for each remaining node.
Repeat the node removal until the two groups are disconnected.
6. Repeat steps 1–5 until the size of the LCC becomes less than θN , where θ = 0.01.
• High betweenness centrality adaptive (abbreviated as Betweenness) [6, 16, 22, 23]:
We remove the node with the largest betweenness centrality. If multiple nodes have
the same largest betweenness centrality value, the node having the largest degree is
removed. We recalculate the betweenness of all nodes every time we remove a node.
We excluded the dynamical importance [3] because it is less successful than the CI on
various networks [9] and than the CbDI on networks with community structure [5]. We also
excluded the immunization algorithms on the basis of the PageRank, closeness centrality,
and k-core, which had been shown to be outperformed by the CI algorithm [9]. This is
because these algorithms do not particularly exploit community structure of the network
such that there is no reason for believing that they would perform competitively on networks
with community structure.
A scale-free network model with community structure
We constructed a scale-free network with built-in community structure as follows [5]. We
first generate a coarse-grained network whose node is regarded as community, using the
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model [56] having NC = 100 nodes and mean degree six. The initial
network is the clique composed of m0 = 3 nodes, and each added node has m = 3 links.
After generating a coarse-grained network, we assign 50 nodes to each community, resulting
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in N = 50×NC = 5000 nodes in total. For each community, the intra-community network is
given by the BA model with m0 = m = 4, which yields the mean within-community degree
equal to 〈k〉` = 2 [(N −m0)m+m0(m0 − 1)/2] /N = 7.6. Additionally, if communities I
and J are adjacent in the coarse-grained network, then nodes i ∈ I and j ∈ J are connected
with probability 〈k〉g/(6N/NC). This guarantees that a node is adjacent to 〈k〉g nodes in
different communities on average. We set 〈k〉g = 1. The mean degree of the entire network
is equal to 〈k〉 = 8.58 ≈ 〈k〉` + 〈k〉g.
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FIG. 1. Concept of the community-based collective influence. (a) Egocentric view of the coarse-
grained network. Each circle represents a community. Two communities are adjacent by a weighted
link if a node in one community is connected to at least one node in the other community. The
link weight in the coarse-grained network is equal to the number of links that connect the two
communities in the original network. Local tree-like structure of the coarse-grained network is
assumed. (b) Illustration of z′I and z
′′
J for ` = 2, in which case I
+ = J−. A line represents
a link in the original network. The dashed circle represents the Ith community. (c) Schematic
of community-based reinsertion. A dashed circle represents a community. Suppose that we will
reinsert either node i or j. If reinserted, node i and j would have a path to two and three
communities, respectively. Therefore, we reinsert node i.
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FIG. 2. Normalized size of the LCC, G(q), plotted against the fraction of removed nodes, q, in
model networks with N = 5000. A curve corresponds to an immunization algorithm. See Methods
for the abbreviations. (a) Scale-free network with prescribed community structure. (b) BA model.
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FIG. 3. Normalized size of the LCC, G(q), plotted against the fraction of removed nodes, q, in two
empirical networks. (a) E-mail communication network in Enron. (b) World Wide Web.
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FIG. 4. The fraction of removed nodes to fragment the network, qc, for an immunization algorithm
divided by the value for the CI algorithm. (a) CbCI combined with Infomap. (b) CbCI combined
with Walktrap. (c) High degree adaptive (Degree). (d) CbDI combined with Infomap. (e) CbDI
combined with Walktrap. (f) Laplacian spectral partitioning (LSP). A symbol represents a network.
The cross represents the model network used in Fig. 2(a). The modularity value, Q, is determined
by the Louvain algorithm.
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FIG. 5. The G value normalized by that for the CI algorithm. (a) CbCI combined with Infomap.
(b) CbCI combined with Walktrap. (c) Degree. (d) CbDI combined with Infomap. (e) CbDI
combined with Walktrap. (f) LSP. The Q value is determined by the Louvain algorithm.
26
TABLE I. Correlation coefficient between an explanatory variable and the normalized qc. The
clustering coefficient is defined by the number of triangles containing the ith node divided by
ki(ki − 1)/2, which is averaged over all nodes 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The weighted clustering coefficient is
defined by
∑N
j,k=1;j,k 6=i(wˆijwˆjkwˆki)
1/3/[ki(ki − 1)], which is averaged over i [48, 49]. Here, wˆij =
wij/max1≤i′,j′≤N (wi′j′), and wij is the weight of the link between the ith and jth nodes. We
calculated the correlation coefficient for each network on the basis of the data points obtained
from the six community detection algorithms. The scattergrams based on which the correlation
coefficient has been calculated are shown in Figs. S5(a), (c), (e), (g), (i), and (k).
clustering
coefficient
weighted
clustering
coefficient
NC
mean path
length
entropy normalized
entropy
AS-1 0.238 0.120 −0.415 −0.354 −0.523 −0.608
AS-2 −0.258 0.119 −0.417 0.065 −0.319 −0.203
PGP 0.298 0.490 −0.603 −0.534 −0.667 −0.781
WWW −0.005 −0.430 0.306 −0.375 0.216 −0.169
email-uni 0.213 −0.053 −0.362 0.125 −0.446 −0.568
email-Enron −0.278 −0.398 −0.073 −0.136 −0.650 −0.817
CA-GrQc 0.438 0.345 −0.773 −0.458 −0.891 −0.934
CA-Astroph −0.154 −0.005 −0.406 −0.144 −0.764 −0.826
CA-Condmat 0.121 −0.181 −0.653 0.219 −0.820 −0.918
CA-HepPh 0.729 0.792 −0.845 −0.569 −0.932 −0.781
CA-HepTh −0.200 −0.118 0.178 0.325 −0.067 −0.320
HEP 0.314 0.204 −0.718 −0.042 −0.842 −0.759
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TABLE II. Correlation coefficient between an explanatory variable and the normalized G for each
network. We calculate the correlation coefficient for each network on the basis of the data points
obtained from the six community detection algorithms. The scattergrams based on which the
correlation coefficient has been calculated are shown in Figs. S5(b), (d), (f), (h), (j), and (l).
clustering
coefficient
weighted
clustering
coefficient
NC
mean path
length
entropy normalized
entropy
AS-1 0.064 0.284 −0.813 −0.259 −0.813 −0.604
AS-2 −0.369 0.416 −0.693 0.105 −0.660 −0.449
PGP 0.084 0.295 −0.489 −0.586 −0.603 −0.766
WWW −0.367 0.111 −0.713 0.281 −0.820 −0.694
email-uni 0.394 0.362 −0.810 0.043 −0.823 −0.595
email-Enron −0.381 −0.224 −0.474 −0.258 −0.804 −0.798
CA-GrQc 0.034 0.045 −0.467 −0.043 −0.679 −0.909
CA-Astroph −0.313 −0.112 −0.137 −0.232 −0.526 −0.700
CA-Condmat 0.334 −0.024 −0.706 0.387 −0.851 −0.839
CA-HepPh 0.227 0.419 −0.424 −0.214 −0.607 −0.685
CA-HepTh 0.248 0.629 −0.632 −0.129 −0.754 −0.730
HEP −0.067 0.400 −0.636 0.395 −0.759 −0.722
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TABLE III. Correlation coefficient between an explanatory variable and a performance measure for
each community detection algorithm. We calculate the correlation coefficient for each community
detection algorithm on the basis of the data points obtained from the 12 empirical networks. qc
and G indicate the values normalized by those for the CI algorithm. The scattergrams based on
which the correlation coefficient has been calculated are shown in Fig. S6.
entropy normalized entropy Q
qc G qc G qc G
Infomap −0.088 0.358 −0.017 −0.206 −0.576 −0.210
Walktrap −0.506 0.014 −0.434 −0.201 −0.348 −0.128
label propagation −0.690 −0.659 −0.630 −0.687 −0.689 −0.797
fast greedy −0.211 −0.099 0.067 −0.081 −0.015 −0.310
simulated annealing −0.695 0.057 −0.288 −0.005 −0.330 −0.391
Louvain −0.791 −0.001 −0.267 −0.370 −0.707 −0.370
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
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S1. CBCI ALGORITHM UNDER AN ONLINE UPDATING OF COMMUNITY
STRUCTURE
As described in the main text, the CbCI algorithm carries out community detection only
once at the beginning of the node removal process. This saves computation time but may
worsen the performance of the immunization because the organization of communities may
change as we remove nodes. In this section, we investigate the impact of recalculating
the community structure repeatedly during the node removal process. We recalculate the
partitioning of the network every time we remove 10−3N nodes. By feeding the most up-
to-date partitioning to the CbCI algorithm, we determine the tentative order of the node
removal. Then, we reinsert the nodes in the same manner as the original CbCI algorithm
does. The entire reinsertion procedure uses the community structure of the original network,
i.e., that determined before the node removal. We reinsert the nodes one by one. We focus
on Infomap and Walktrap, with which the CbCI algorithm performs the best. We use AS-1,
PGP, and CA-GrQc networks for illustration.
The immunization results for the CbCI algorithm with online updating of the community
structure are compared with those for the original CbCI algorithm and the CI algorithm in
Fig. S1. The figure indicates that online updating of the community structure improves the
performance of the CbCI algorithm in some cases but not in others.
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FIG. S1. Online updating of the community structure in the CbCI algorithm. In each panel, the
size of the LCC under the original CbCI algorithm, the CbCI algorithm with online updating of
the community structure, and the CI algorithm is plotted against q.
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FIG. S2. Normalized size of the LCC, G(q), plotted against the fraction of removed nodes, q,
for different networks and immunization algorithms. In (a), the results for the label-propagation
community detection algorithm are absent because it yields no community (i.e., Nc = 0) for this
network. 3
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FIG. S3. Threshold fraction of removed nodes to fragment the network, qc, for the CbCI and
CbDI algorithms combined with different community detection algorithms. The shown qc values
are normalized by those for the CI algorithm. Each panel represents an immunization algorithm. A
symbol represents a network. We calculated the modularity (i.e., Q) using the Louvain algorithm.
The results for Infomap and Walktrap are identical to those shown in Figs. 4(a), (b), (d), and (e).
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FIG. S6. Comparison of the different networks using the relationship between the entropy and
performance measures. (a) Relationship between the unnormalized entropy and the normalized qc.
(b) Relationship between the normalized entropy and the normalized qc. (c) Relationship between
the unnormalized entropy and the normalized G. (d) Relationship between the normalized entropy
and the normalized G.
24
  




,QIRPDS
ρ = 0.358
n
o
r
m
a
li
z
e
d
G
F
  




:DONWUDS
ρ = 0.014
  




/3
ρ = −0.659
  




IDVWJUHHG\
ρ = −0.099
  




6$
ρ = 0.057
HQWURS\   




/RXYDLQ
ρ = −0.001
  




,QIRPDS
ρ = −0.206
n
o
r
m
a
li
z
e
d
G
G
  




:DONWUDS
ρ = −0.201
  




/3
ρ = −0.687
  




IDVWJUHHG\
ρ = −0.081
  




6$
ρ = −0.005
QRUPDOL]HGHQWURS\   




/RXYDLQ
ρ = −0.370
25
TABLE S1. Summary statistics of the model and empirical networks. N , M , and ⟨k⟩ represent
the number of nodes, that of links, and the average degree, respectively.
Network N M ⟨k⟩ References
scale-free with
communities
5,000 21,440 8.58 [1]
BA 5,000 29,979 11.99 [2]
AS-1 6,474 12,572 3.88 [3, 4]
AS-2 10,670 22,002 4.12 [3, 4]
PGP 10,680 24,316 4.55 [5]
WWW 99,193 178,840 3.61 [6]
email-uni 63,495 96,777 3.05 [7]
email-Enron 33,696 180,811 10.73 [4, 8–10]
CA-GrQc 4,158 13,422 6.46 [4, 11]
CA-Astroph 17,903 196,972 22.00 [4, 11]
CA-Condmat 21,363 91,286 8.55 [4, 11]
CA-HepPh 11,204 117,619 21.00 [3, 4, 12]
CA-HepTh 8,638 24,806 5.74 [3, 4, 12]
HEP 27,400 352,021 25.69 [13]
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TABLE S2. Community structure of the model and empirical networks detected by different algo-
rithms. The number of communities, NC, and the modularity, Q, are shown for each community
detection algorithm. LP: label propagation. SA: simulated annealing. We implemented the In-
fomap, label propagation, and simulated annealing algorithm using the codes available at [14], the
Walktrap using the codes available at [15], the fast greedy algorithm using the codes available at
[16], and the Louvain algorithm using the codes available at [17].
Infomap Walktrap LP fast greedy SA Louvain
Network NC Q NC Q NC Q NC Q NC Q NC Q
BA 256 0.174 219 0.166 0 n.a. 12 0.250 19 0.250 13 0.253
AS-1 358 0.551 184 0.599 172 0.552 38 0.603 33 0.590 30 0.626
AS-2 524 0.544 262 0.599 241 0.549 42 0.614 33 0.579 33 0.629
PGP 924 0.813 946 0.830 959 0.817 205 0.853 118 0.812 96 0.883
WWW 3,643 0.823 3,607 0.805 4,334 0.815 1,067 0.850 936 0.822 186 0.890
email-uni 2,534 0.705 1,731 0.716 2,183 0.689 310 0.728 389 0.718 121 0.777
email-Enron 1,385 0.544 1,056 0.544 958 0.324 525 0.511 235 0.585 191 0.608
CA-GrQc 323 0.785 290 0.799 358 0.780 70 0.796 63 0.792 43 0.848
CA-Astroph 735 0.561 1,154 0.542 344 0.292 183 0.492 55 0.586 42 0.627
CA-Condmat 1,186 0.646 1,302 0.627 1,475 0.634 266 0.628 189 0.600 53 0.726
CA-HepPh 627 0.612 910 0.596 373 0.451 138 0.583 74 0.628 39 0.658
CA-HepTh 596 0.680 549 0.676 640 0.666 115 0.703 101 0.661 53 0.755
HEP 674 0.579 773 0.608 477 0.613 120 0.525 33 0.606 29 0.653
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